Report of Squadron Leader L.A.Harling ? Crash Crane 1A FJ214 9?/7/42 1. On the evening of July 8, flying was scheduled for 1700 hours to 2100 hours. Flying was begun on time and all flights ? were authorized to carry out local flying at the Main Aerodrome and at the two Relief fields. Cross-country flights were not authorised in view of the weather report which indicated thunder storms. 2. I stayed the early part of the evening on the aerodrome observing flying operations. I had been on the field about two hours when, at a very view minutes before 1900 hours, I observed the sky was very dark, indicating the approach of a storm. I proceeded by car to the Control Tower and arrived just as a signal was made for ?washing out flying. Realising that this was not an ordinary storm approaching, and that a wind shift was likely to occur, I obtained smoke generators, and ignited some on the aerodrome in three different places. The storm broke suddenly and it was with great difficulty that the aircraft in the circuit managed to land safely. During the heavy rain which fell with winds 40-50 miles per hour, one aircraft flown by two pupils appeared over the aerodrome and several times attempted to land, obviously the student pilot was frightened and confused. He eventually landed considerably ? wind, and in so doing, damaged the undercarriage of the aircraft, but both occupants escaped injury. During all this, the ambulance and crash tender and a complete ground crew was standing by. 3. When all the local aircraft were on the ground, I proceeded to the Control Tower to collect reports by telephone from the relief fields. Upon checking up, it was found that a number of aircraft were still unaccounted for. These later reported in by telephone from various widely separated distances - two in Aberdeen, in a field; two at Lac Vert, in a field; four at Prince Albert aerodrome; five at ?. These had all landed safely. The one remaining aircraft unaccounted for was reported to be abandoned and had crashed near Warman. The occupants, P/O Small and LAC Burrowes, had made a successful parachute descents. These two were taken by car to Osler Relief Field considerably shaken by their experience, neither had suffered injury. 4. The worst of the storm was over in about 45 minutes, and when the wind had subsided, aircraft were recalled from the relief aerodrome, and those in out- lying districts, instructed to remain over night. 5. In my experience at this unit which date from October, 1940, I have never witnessed such a storm, nor have I ever seen one approach as suddenly and without warning, from an almost clear sky. This incident has been an object lesson of great value to all pilots here, and is being made the subject of a general lecture to all pupil and trainee pilots. Page2 6. It is thought that one of the factors which contributed largely in P/O Small's decision to abandon aircraft was the fact that the flight instruments are mainly on the left side of the instrument panel, and from his position in the right-hand seat, he was unable to do instrument flying after the gyro horizon apparently became ?unviewable. P/O Small makes some mention of being unable to move the controls, but it is noted that his speed at this time was about 250 M.P.H. Such a high speed might account for him thinking that they had jammed. 7. It would appear that it was impossible to carry out parachute drill as outlined in the C.A.F 100? for Crane aircraft, due to the jolting of the aircraft. When the pupil attempted this procedure, he was held against the door jamb by the force of the slipstream. Both pilots seem to think that a head-first plunge from the aircraft would make a better exit. So far as they know, the tail plane missed them by a comfortable margin, even though the speed was high. 8 When interviewed. tje witnesses, made mention of in the Engineering Officer's report, could give very little information of value, except that the aeroplane remained intact until striking the ground. A ? of the area ? confirmed this observation. A remarkable aspect of this crash was that the engines were not buried, but were broken up so completely, that any part of them could be picked up in one hand. (L.A. Harling) Squadron Leader, Commanding Officer, No. 4 S.F.T.S., R.C.A.F., Saskatoon, Saskatchewan.